The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) is gradually gaining clout and influence in the Central Asian region, which is increasingly attracting international attention. Dramatic events during the course of 2005 in Uzbekistan, including the US withdrawal from the Manas base, and in Kyrgyzstan significantly changed the regional security architecture and provided a new geopolitical role for the SCO in the region. Russia and China have especially benefited from these changes and have increased their profiles in the region.
On August 16, 2007 Bishkek hosted the 7th annual summit of the SCO. The summit was attended by the heads of states of all its principal members. Iran and Mongolia were represented by their presidents, while the other two observers-India and Pakistan-were represented by their Minister of Petroleum and Natural Gas and Foreign Minister, respectively. Other important dignitaries who attended the summit were the Afghan and Turkmen presidents and by UN Deputy Secretary-General Linn Pasko. The summit concluded with the signing of a Treaty among member states on "good-neighbourly relations, friendship and cooperation." The Bishkek Declaration was issued and a set of ten documents were adopted. In addition, an agreement on cooperation in the field of culture was initialled and the leaders approved the action plan to ensure International Information Security (IIS).
The major focus of the Summit was on enhancing cooperation in the energy and security realms, particularly the countering of terrorist threats, and regional stability. SCO leaders called for a multilateral approach to address global problems. They also discussed the issue of stemming the proliferation of weapons and illegal narcotics, reviewed measures to bolster information security, and resolved to establish a new SCO University. The message from the summit was loud and clear - "the world is bigger than the West". It was also decided that the next summit will convene in the Tajik capital, Dushanbe.
At the top of the agenda was improving transportation and energy links between member states, which, the summit agreed, is the basis for "sustainable economic growth and security." President Nazarbayaev proposed the formation of "an energy Club", stating that "a mechanism of meetings of energy ministers from the SCO member and observer states should function in the context of the idea of an energy club, and that this might become one of the main elements of an Asian energy strategy." It was agreed to create a "unified energy market" to facilitate the movement of oil and gas supplies among members. The Bishkek Declaration specified that energy dialogue will include producer, transit and consumer states.
A second important issue that was taken up at the summit was the necessity and urgency of taking precautionary measures and establishing relevant mechanisms to tackle threats to regional peace, security and stability. Leaders agreed to step up efforts to crack down on illegal immigration, drug trafficking and terrorism. They also pointedly declared that regional stability and security is the responsibility of countries and organisations of the region. The Declaration issued at the end of the summit stated that "stability and security in Central Asia can be ensured primarily by the regional states themselves, through existing regional associations." Highlighting the SCO's increasing focus on regional security, the Russian President emphasized on the need to create a "counter-terrorism security belt" within the framework of the grouping. Putin also called for an end to the unipolar approach to international affairs.
The issue of "illegal interference" in the affairs of other countries was raised by the Iranian President Mohmoud Ahmadinejad, who spoke of the US attempt to impose "a new political map in Middle East" and its deployment of missile defence systems, which affected the security of the whole of Asia and of the SCO countries in particular. Islam Karimov, in contrast, drew attention to growing tensions among SCO members over water resources and warned that this could lead to regional conflict. The declaration issued at the end of summit called for "strengthening strategic stability and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction" and urged the need to prevent the militarization of outer space.
At the same time, the summit also highlighted the need to counter terrorism and singled out the negative regional influence of Afghanistan's illegal drug trade. Both President Putin and Hu Jintao assured President Hamid Karzai their support and willingness to help rebuild his country, while Putin went a step ahead and proposed a special SCO summit to plan a reconstruction strategy for Afghanistan as well.
SCO leaders pledged to deepen cooperation with the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), the Eurasian Economic Community (EEC), and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) on the basis of current Memoranda of Understanding. For his part, the Tajik President went to the extent of proposing a merger of the SCO with the Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO).
An important event that unfolded parallel to the Summit was the first SCO military exercise 'Peace Mission-2007' held in the southern Urals. The militaries of all SCO members participated in this 9-day exercise (August 9 to 17), which focused on counter-terror operations. The exercise involved 6500 soldiers, including some 2000 from Russia, 1700 from China, smaller company-size units from Kazakhstan and Tajikistan, a special police platoon from Kyrgyzstan, and a team of 20 Uzbek military officers. About 500 combat vehicles and 80 combat aircraft from China and Russia were also employed.
The SCO, thus, seems to be emerging as a new geopolitical arrangement in the international arena. Some observers view these SCO summits as becoming increasingly influential and the organisation turning into a prestigious regional club with global ambitions. Others have described the SCO as an eastern response to NATO. The Russian media has gone to the extent of calling it "Warsaw Pact II" and the "the anti-NATO". However, SCO officials concede that the organisation is in fact "pretty rudimentary".
The Bishkek summit and the Peace Mission 2007 are clear manifestations of a growing Sino-Russian axis in the region at least in the short term. Western media reports have expressed the view that the Sino-Russian "strategic partnership" is aimed at counterbalancing Washington's policies, given that both countries "share a heightening distrust of what they see as the United States' oversized role and influence in global politics." However, the fact remains that Moscow and Beijing are rivals in the region. Moreover, Russia hopes to intensify its linkages with Europe. It therefore remains to be seen for how long the Sino-Russian partnership remains "strategic". Further, the SCO's priority is not political concerns but energy cooperation. Even in this regard, there could be potential trouble in future given what seems to be the relative neglect of the interests of the organisation's smaller members, viz., Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, as against the greater priority being assigned to the economic and strategic interests of China and Russia.
The Caliphate Conference of Hizb ut-Tahrir (HuT) in Jakarta on August 12, 2007 brought together its global leadership from more than twenty countries. It reemphasized the establishment of an Islamic Caliphate and uniformity in governance in Muslim-majority countries of the world. The conference, which was attended by almost 100,000 supporters and sympathisers, is indicative of the increasing influence of the HuT in Southeast Asia. Another remarkable aspect of the conference was the sizeable representation of women among those who attended it.
Abu Baker Bashir, who had been implicated in the Bali bomb blasts but was released after serving a short sentence in June 2006, also addressed the conference. Bashir is stated to be the spiritual head of Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), a radical Islamic network active in Southeast Asia and neighbouring areas, and aspires to establish a pan-Islamic state in the region. According to interrogation reports of captured JI leaders like Abu Dujana and Zarkasih, Bashir headed the JI in the past. Now he is nurturing the ambition of contesting in the 2009 Indonesian presidential elections. The HuT conference provided him a unique forum for gauging the likely support his potential candidature would receive. Also, HuT has been emphasizing on inculcating Islamic values in students through madrasas and peasantrens (Islamic boarding schools), which is what has been propagated by the JI as well.
The conference also gains importance because of the controversial discourse on the issue of Malaysia being an Islamic state (though only its official religion is Islam) and the implementation of Shariah laws in the autonomous province of Aceh. Indonesia, which has been projecting a moderate face of Islam, has been active in addressing the roots of radical Islam and trying to implement counter-radicalization efforts as well as apprehending terrorists belonging to Al Qaeda affiliated groups. But the question remains as to whether Indonesia would be able to maintain this positive image globally while at the same time reducing the scope for radical rhetoric propagated by Global Islamic Movements like the Hizb ut-Tahrir. Within Southeast Asia, quite a number of radical groups and even terrorist organizations have been marginalised and their leaders are being either decimated or arrested. The waning strength in terrorist cadres and greater inter-religious dialogue in the region have indicated positive signs of engagement with Islam. However, it remains to be seen how far conferences like these would provide a boost to radicalization of local politics and governance.
It is worth mentioning that prior to the Jakarta conference two Hizb ut-Tahrir leaders from the UK and Australia were denied entry into Indonesia. A Palestinian HuT leader, Shiek Issam Amera, was not permitted by the Palestinian authorities themselves to visit Jakarta. The role of the UK chapter of HuT deserves highlighting here. Prohibited, closely monitored or facing legal actions in continental Europe, Hizb ut-Tahrir has so far been able to maintain its activities in the UK. The issue of prohibiting the activities of the HuT came up after the 7/7 London bombings and again during Gordon Brown's first question time in the House of Commons after his assumption of the prime ministership. It has been a recurrent theme in the British media as well as in concerned quarters. The HuT's latest conference in the UK on August 4, 2007 reiterated its earlier claims that it is a global Islamic party with the revivalist agenda of establishing a global Caliphate through non-violent means. Similarly, a polemical HuT booklet, titled "Radicalisation, Extremism & 'Islamism': Realities and Myths in the War on Terror" and published in July 2007, is an attempt to allay doubts within the British establishment that "the party (HuT) does not work in the West to change the system of government, but works within the boundaries of the system."
However, the entire gamut of HuT literature reinforces its vision of a theological leadership of a perceived Ummah and its intellectual supremacy over the global Islamic discourse. Terming 'many if not most of the Muslim countries' as 'dysfunctional', the HuT does not only use a broad brush but demeans the indigenous leadership in Muslim countries or in countries where Muslims are in a sizeable minority.
It is clear that be it in Europe or in South East Asia the HuT wants to replace the diaspora-based or the indigenous Islamic organisations as dialogue partners with the national governments. In South Asia, where it has organisational presence like in Pakistan and Bangladesh, it wants local people to replace the old government-opposition dichotomy and embrace a new face of Islam that transcends national boundaries and find solutions for all problems in an all-embracing Khilafah. Conducting secret study circles, readers' clubs, mixing local issues with a global Islamist agenda and banking upon the failures and deficits in our neighbouring countries, would therefore remain their working methods in the future. Students and young professionals from Muslim countries would continue to be its target group. It is necessary to monitor the HuT's public propaganda, wherein it exploits local politics and mixes it with its larger global Islamist agenda. For, this course would ultimately lead its followers down an ideological cul-de-sac as is becoming increasingly clear from the testimonies of its former members.
Come August, Assam and Nagaland breathed a sigh of relief with the heavens opening up to an extent, bringing with it much respite to the local people from recurring floods and landslide plagued roadways. But with the retreat of the heavy rains, a different if not less difficult situation has emerged. The political atmosphere in both states was charged up with tension in early August following a "war like situation" in the Assam-Nagaland border near Jorhat district in Assam and Mokokchung district in Nagaland, respectively.
On August 5, functionaries of the All Assam Students' Union (AASU) issued a threat to forcefully march into Nagaland on August 8 and destroy the Nagaland Police check post at Tsutapela on the Mariani-Mokokchung road near the border town of Mariani in Assam. Assam and Nagaland have in the recent past contested over territory, which is further manifested by the demand of the Naga militant outfit-the National Socialist Council of Nagalim-Isak-Muivah (NSCN-IM) for a greater Nagaland, encompassing areas in Assam. In July, some Naga villagers had raided three villages near Geleki in Sivasagar district of Assam, killing two residents and torching several houses. The incident had provoked the AASU to call for an economic blockade on Nagaland. This time around, the border crisis reached a tipping point when the Ao Senden (Hoho/council) issued a statement calling upon all Ao villages in the border areas to be prepared for any eventuality and asserted its resolve to forcefully defend every inch of Ao Naga land bordering Assam. The Senden's executive council decided to field volunteers from the border district of Mokokchung and nearby villages to thwart the threatened AASU invasion. Worse still, on August 8, villagers of the bordering Tzurang valley in Nagaland readied themselves for a bloody battle with the AASU armed with machetes, spears, and firearms. Mokokchung town also witnessed simmering tension with several hundred armed people gathering around the Ao Senden office. Many resorted to blank firing in order to pressurize the Ao Senden president, Temjenkaba, a lawyer by profession, to give them the go ahead to march to the Tsutapela police outpost to violently resist the AASU across the border. But the Sendem refused to resort to such an extreme step, before giving the Mokokchung and Jorhat district administrations a chance to prevent the crisis.
Thankfully, the situation did not spiral out of control as the five hundred AASU activists were intercepted by the Assam Police near New Sonowal border outpost before they could march to the Tsutapela outpost. The effective co-ordination between the Mokokchung and Jorhat administrations also held the situation in check. What was heartening to see was the strong resistance to the AASU's planned invasion by Assamese border villages, which univocally stated that they did not support any violent moves to resolve border differences. Villagers in Bosagaon, Panchul, Nagaon and New Sonowal came out in large numbers to prevent the AASU from marching to the outpost. They demanded that the AASU honour its March 22, 2004 Merapani joint declaration with the Naga Students' Federation (NSF), which supported a resolution of border disputes through a people to people approach. This position had been reinstated by the two student units on July 14, 2007 in a meeting at Guwahati. The restraint shown by the Assamese villages was duly appreciated by the NSF in a statement issued by its President, Imchatoba Imchen, on August 9 in Dimapur.
The question however arises as to why the AASU issued a threat of invasion in early August despite having stated its commitment to the joint declaration a month earlier. Lurking behind this unwarranted step by the AASU is a devious strategy of provocation of a violent clash between the Naga and Assamese border villages, which have witnessed harmonious relations for centuries, in order to gain political leverage. Such provocations are worrisome and beset with serious security implications. Similar border disputes between the two hill districts of Assam, namely Karbi Anglong and North Cachar Hills, in the 1980s and 1990s, which had resulted in non-violent youth mobilization, have at present spiralled into full fledged insurgencies like the United People's Democratic Solidarity and the Dima Halam Daogah, with both groups soliciting support from reluctant villagers on either side of the ethnic aisle by show of force.
Reactions in Naga villages to the AASU's threat are telling in this regard. Their violent responses could be easily manipulated by militant groups like the NSCN (IM), the NSCN (K) and the United Liberation Front of Asom to foment a violent border dispute in future. It cannot also be ruled out that these outfits could be behind the present crisis as well.
Ironically, it is under this sort of violent pressure that the three member Local Commission on Border held a meeting with representatives from Assam and Nagaland in Dimapur on August 6 to resolve the border dispute. The Commission has requested both states to carve out maps based on the "1.50 thousand scale" of the disputed areas. The Surveyor General of India has also agreed to chip in to help expedite the process. Indeed, it is unacceptable that both state governments continue to let a contentious issue fester for decades without holding any serious border talks to resolve the crisis. Their apathy only lands the local populace in a spot. Though the current tension has subsided, this issue could again raise its ugly head and provide a breeding ground of discontent for student organizations on both sides of the border, who, given a chance, will not hesitate to overrule local sentiments and discredit the sanctity of the Border Peace Coordination Committee (BPCC) formed by Assamese and Naga civil society. The BPCC has been trying to create an atmosphere conducive to peaceful talks between the peoples on either side of the border to resolve the issue. There is every possibility that with the growing number of such potentially violent incidences under the nose of state forces, some, if not all, villages will definitely turn to militant groups for security.
The district administrations of Mokokchung in Nagaland and Jorhat in Assam need to be applauded for performing well the task they are normally assigned to do-maintaining law and order-for a change. The Deputy Commissioners, Abhishek Singh and L. S. Sangson of Mokokchung and Jorhat respectively were proactive in keeping the local people informed and guaranteeing them security. However, one cannot help but take note of the ability of AASU activists to reach the New Sonowal border outpost (so chillingly near the threatened place of attack-the Tsutapela border outpost) on August 8 without being intercepted by the state forces. A slight misinformation could have provoked the armed Naga villagers to rush towards the Tsutapela outpost and, in the process, kill innocents villagers caught in the line of fire. Notoriously, the NSCN (K) is supposedly functioning in this area and the NSCN (IM) is also sustaining a strong covert presence. With these two militant outfits joining the fray, the entire issue could have turned into a factional turf battle--a worse case scenario but not entirely improbable. It is therefore high time that the state governments take serious note of these issues, shake off their lethargy and work out an acceptable framework for border talks without always depending on the Centre to do what is necessary.
Overseas energy being a key factor in India's economic development, it is necessary to think whether we need to treat the country's global quest for energy resources as a purely commercial interaction with the energy market or as a larger strategy involving diplomatic activism. While not ignoring the importance of nuclear or alternative sources in the country's energy landscape, we need to understand that petroleum sources would continue to be indispensable for India's fuel economy in the foreseeable future. Even if India's electricity production increases to a significant level using a wide spectrum of resources, it is undeniable that many of our industries and most of the transportation sector will not be able to sustain themselves without adequate oil and natural gas supply.
Hence, the prime questions that arise are: Can India achieve energy independence in terms of petroleum supply? Will domestic petroleum reserves/production be able to address the country's energy needs? How well is India prepared to address the energy security concerns arising out of the global energy market?
For an economy that is growing at a pace of 8-10 per cent, complete energy independence in the coming decades appears to be a distant dream. India's current petroleum reserves are estimated at 5.7 billion barrels of oil and 37.95 trillion cubic meters of natural gas, with a reserve production ratio as per the current production levels of oil and gas estimated at 19.3 years and 33.9 years, respectively. Recent claims by some domestic energy industry majors about finding large natural gas reserves in the Krishna-Godavari (KG) basin are yet to be fully verified and integrated into the present reserve estimate. However, with increasing demand for petroleum fuels, the reserve-production ratio would certainly come down unless new energy reserves are found domestically. This indicates that the increasing demand for energy sources would certainly push forward the country's dependence on the global market in terms of resources and technological support.
For its global energy quest, India primarily needs to focus on two aspects: a) ensuring trans-border energy transport options; and b) acquiring energy equity and long term energy contracts. While the major trans-border energy transportation options are currently limited to the proposed natural gas pipelines, namely, the Iran-Pakistan-India (IPI) pipeline, the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) pipeline, and the Myanmar-Bangladesh-India (MBI) pipeline, some experts have also observed the possibility of trans-border electricity lines to India from Nepal and Bhutan. Despite the fact that economic or technological feasibility for most of these plan exists, political feasibility continues to be a crucial question that needs to be taken into consideration before charting out an energy strategy. Though domestic political volatility in or geopolitical rivalry among supplier/transit countries adversely affect India's energy interests in these trans-border energy transportation plans, it is important to note that effective diplomatic measures would certainly help enhance India's stakes in such scenarios.
In recent years the country witnessed the MBI pipeline, which was proposed to transport natural gas from Myanmar and Bangladesh to India, suffered serious political hurdles and finally led Yangon to choose China. This happened despite the Oil and Natural Gas Ltd (ONGC) and Gas Authority of India Ltd (GAIL) together holding a 30 per cent stake in the A-1 offshore Block containing natural gas reserves. The Myanmar Ministry of Energy claims that apart from the A1 Block, the country has identified 24 more natural gas reserves offshore blocks, of which a total of 15 blocks are still available for exploration and development. However, on December 7, 2005, PetroChina signed a Memorandum of Understanding with Myanmar's Energy Ministry for the sale of 6.5 tcf of natural gas from the A-1 Block. Myanmar has been in Chinese energy radar for a long time not only for oil and natural gas reserves but also to build a pipeline connecting Sittwe port to Yunnan province, which might eventually avoid Chinese supply traversing through the Malacca Straits. Despite the two countries moving closer on energy deals, there were no official statements from either Yangon or Beijing, nor was India kept informed about developments on this front. As a further step, in April 2007, China's National Development and Reform Commission approved a plan to construct an oil pipeline between the deepwater port of Sittwe and Kunming, Yunnan's capital.
A question that arises here is could India have cracked the deal with Yangon had New Delhi been aware of China's energy intentions in Myanmar? India's Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas (MoPNG) website cites 'bilateral issues with Bangladesh' and affirms that 'the option of getting Bangladesh on board is being pursued,' while the Myanmar puzzle remains unanswered! In fact, India has not lost any deals to China, though it has failed to gain any breakthrough in the energy sector with Yangon. This, despite the important role Myanmar would have played in India's energy sector in terms of natural gas supply as well as in its long term strategic ambitions of land connectivity to South East Asia.
With regard to the global search for energy, there have been incidents of Indian energy companies facing challenges from their Chinese counterparts. While the Indian side insists that these incidents should be seen purely from a commercial angle, it is imperative to understand the reach of economic and diplomatic measures Beijing has adopted in outbidding its competitors. Energy co-operation that was initiated between India and China is yet to make any significant progress in terms of energy supply as the two instances of joint overseas contracts provide only about 2 million tons of oil per year to India.
Given that most of the global energy resources have either been mapped or under exploration and development, India is likely to face tougher competition in the global energy market especially in acquiring equity stakes or energy contracts. While some claim that India's energy supply is ensured by the global market mechanism, it is necessary to understand that the so-called market would certainly reflect global price differences, which results in a fatter energy bill for the country and a long term impact on its GDP. Oil imports during April-May 2007 were valued at US $9165.20 million, which was 1.01 per cent higher than oil imports worth $9073.62 million during the corresponding period last year. With crude prices still hovering above $70 per barrel, the burden of over dependency on the open market would certainly necessitate the country entering into more long term energy contracts and acquiring more equity stakes.
While India has an 'Integrated Energy Policy' to address its energy security concerns both on the domestic and overseas arenas, it is imperative that policy makers mould an overseas energy strategy to positively address political concerns. New Delhi needs to work towards not only addressing issues like the MBI pipeline, but also to minimize the challenges it might face in its worldwide energy search. In short, the foreign policy element in India's energy strategy needs to be strengthened.
Bangladesh's Chief of Staff General Mooen U Ahmed's visit to India scheduled in the fourth week of August now stands postponed in wake of the severe floods sweeping across the country. This visit by the army chief was keenly awaited in India and is particularly significant in the light of the political developments that have taken place in Bangladesh ever since the Khaleda Zia-led BNP coalition government demitted office in October 2006. As is widely known, a series of unprecedented events led to the cancellation of the 9th Jatiya Sangsad (parliamentary) election and the promulgation of emergency with the present caretaker government under Fakhruddin Ahmed taking over on January 11, 2007. This second interim government immediately embarked on a series of sweeping political and electoral reforms aimed at consolidation of democracy, which included wide ranging anti corruption measures against individuals and institutions. While the caretaker government quickly took charge and stabilised the volatile domestic situation, given the nature of tasks it had on hand the government had to entrust and rely largely on the Army for implementing many of them.
Despite the civilian face of the present administration, the composition of the cabinet of advisors to the caretaker government is a clear reflection of the ground realities. Two of the ten advisors have a service background and the two most coveted posts in Bangladesh, namely that of the head of the Anti Corruption Committee and the Election Commission, are both held by ex army chiefs.
Certainly the army in Bangladesh has been the most stable organisation and the previous BNP government during its five years tenure relied largely on the army to restore law and order and address the growing internal violence in Bangladesh. Over the years the army has become the bastion of law in the country, which has ensured that continued to receive political support and patronage. While the present administration has firmly taken grip of the state of affairs, the army has also been making its presence felt in more than one way. Unlike in the past, ever since Bangladesh became a parliamentary democracy, the army has been visible periodically though it has been very rarely heard. On previous occasions, the army has performed duties when called upon to do so but quietly retreated to its barracks once the job was done.
But in the last seven months the army has not only been very active but also vocal about its performance and achievements. Ironically, the first political articulation by the present Army Chief was an open indictment of Bangladeshi politicians, although given the highly sensitive domestic opinion he had to at the same time affirm the army's intention to stay behind the scenes and not capture power or directly run the country.
As developments unfolded in Bangladesh it became apparent that the power centres were located not only within the interim government but also rested with the armed forces. President Iajuddin Ahmed's recent praise of the army as the saviour of the country is in recognition of the role played by the armed forces during recent crises. For the first time since 1991, the army has also been made responsible for the preparation of the national ID and voters list. In keeping with the government's promise of holding elections by 2008, the Election Commission has in fact laid out a timeline, which included October 2008 as the date by which the voters list with photographs is to be completed and the Jatiya Sangsad elections to be held by December. It also intends to discuss electoral reforms with the political parties between September and November 2007 and complete these by early 2008. But given the purposeful undermining of the two main political parties, the Awami League and the Bangladesh Nationalist party as well as their leaders Sheikh Hasina and Khaleda Zia, while at the same time ignoring various other forces, it is quite evident that the present dispensation is not above having its own political interests. While the Army's lack of political ambition has been reiterated time and again, there is no guaranteeing that either the army or the interim government is above structuring a political party to pursue their political ambitions. Indeed, it was during the Chief Advisor's first visit abroad for the SAARC Summit that Moeen Ahmed was brandishing his own brand of democracy suitable to Bangladesh. And despite the army's full backing to the government, the obvious strain between the two axes of power is also surfacing.
While many argue that the threat of the United Nations to withdraw Bangladeshi peace keeping forces from its blue helmet duties is effective to keep the army from taking on a more open political role, there is also a growing dissatisfaction within the armed forces and demands to emerge from behind the shadows of the technocratic government may soon gain more ground. Thus, Iajuddin Ahmed's recent advice to the army to stay above political ambition cannot certainly be seen in isolation.
Arguably, in the past, the consecutive military regimes have known to have embraced the very vices that they had usurped power to remove. Consequently, the idea of the armed forces running the government is not viewed with much favour in the country. On the contrary, Bangladeshis are demanding democracy more passionately than ever before. Notwithstanding the questionable track record of the democratic governments, there was a discernible hope in domestic quarters about the outcome of a non-elected government taking over power. Not only would the unfolding crisis be averted by this caretaker government, but also its reform plans would instil Bangladesh with stronger democratic practices which successive elected leaders have failed to do. Despite certain murmurs of dissatisfaction being heard across Bangladesh about some of its actions, it will be the army backed caretaker government that will for at least another year call the shots in Bangladesh.
Thus, when the Army Chief, recently promoted to a full general with extension of tenure beyond 2008, visits India, it would be the best opportunity to obtain a firm commitment on the various Indian security concerns that emanate from Bangladesh. Recent months have witnessed a spate of visits, talks, and meetings between India and Bangladesh. This frequency of bilateral contacts beginning with the External Affairs Minister Pranab Mukherjee's Dhaka visit in February 2007, have included amongst others the high profile foreign secretary talks. The number of meetings at varied levels now taking place by itself is a positive development irrespective of what ground has actually been covered between the two countries. There is also a clear indication that there is an effort by both nations to address their mutual concerns. And when one of Bangladesh's most important person, if not the most vital personality, visits India hopefully soon, the least one can expect is that the expression of political will be corroborated by actions in addressing India's vital security concerns that have long remain unattended.
Even though the Indo-US nuclear deal has passed one more hurdle with the completion of the 123 Agreement to the satisfaction of both governments, the remaining hurdles include the signing of agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) before the Agreement can go back to the US Congress for its final imprimatur. As has been implicitly acknowledged by the two parties to the Agreement, both in their haste and their willingness to find innovative solutions to work around the complex technicalities, this Nuclear Deal, conceived during the Second Presidency of George W. Bush, can be signed, sealed and delivered in its present form only in the current Presidency. A varied set of factors, ranging from President Bush's unorthodox style of functioning, his disinclination towards a graduated approach, his disregard for the nitty-gritty and the Administration's calculation that opposition from the Non-Proliferation Lobby would be balanced out by support from the business lobby and sections of the intelligentsia and the strategic community, were in varying degrees responsible for getting the Deal off the ground on the American side. The requirement of a team that was in line with the President's vision of Indo-US Relations is underscored by the fact that the Next Steps in Strategic Partnership (NSSP) had sputtered along without any clear end goals during the period of Rice's predecessor at the State Department.
Having come this far over a two year period, it is imperative that the Deal is concluded in the remaining seventeen odd months of this Presidency. Current polls show that Democrats are tipped to take over the Presidency in 2009, barring unforeseen events. A new Administration would take time to settle down and would have its attention focused on resolving the mess in Iraq in particular and West Asia in general. A Democrat Administration would also have a substantially different perspective on not just the Nuclear Deal but the on strategic scenario as well.
Though the nuclear deal has not figured as an issue in the campaign for the Democratic nomination, other issues related to South Asia have cropped up from time to time, particularly between the two current frontrunners for the Democratic Party nomination, Hillary Clinton and Barack Obama. This could conceivably colour the approach of whoever ultimately wins the presidency. The Obama camp has accused the Hillary camp of being too close to her Indian American supporters, while at the same time paying lip service to the contentious issue of outsourcing, a theme later taken up by the Los Angeles Times. While Obama had to apologise for a background sheet issued by his supporters dubbing Clinton as the Senator from Punjab, the Clinton camp has been using Obama's recent utterances on carrying out targeted strikes on terrorist camps in Pakistan as an example of his inexperience in foreign policy.
With outsourcing of jobs to India still a contentious issue, particularly among the middle- class who form the mainstay of the Democratic Party (as evidenced by numerous blog posts on the subject), Clinton would be much more susceptible to accusations of being soft on India and would necessarily have to take a tougher stand on issues such as the nuclear deal. At the same time, she is likely to seek something more substantial by way of quid pro quo than a general belief that India and the United States were natural allies. Similarly, while Obama is an unknown quantity, being a freshman Senator, his utterances on the nuclear deal wherein he expressed concern that the mechanism set in place through the Deal was flawed and that there had not been "as systematic an approach as I would like to see" could give some pointers to the approach to the Deal in an Obama White House. Given that there are any number of contentious issues ranging from trade negotiations to climate change protocols on which the Democrats can be expected to take a tougher stand than the incumbent Administration, it is doubtful that any Democrat Administration would go beyond the relationship style that was the hallmark of the Bill Clinton Administration - high on style and symbolism, but low on substance. Thus, beginning the relationship with a new Administration on a clean slate should be the preferred choice for India.
The latest Comptroller and Auditor General (C&AG) Performance Report on Defence Services (No. 4 of 2007) has once again exposed the problems involved in Indian defence acquisition. The report has been critical virtually of all the processes of the acquisition cycle, from planning to the formulation of Qualitative Requirements (QRs), vendor selection, conduct of trial and evaluations and processes of induction. It is in this perspective that a close examination is needed to get into the genesis of the problems and come out with an alternative solution that promotes efficient acquisition, which is moreover in tune with the best international practices.
Defence capital acquisition is a long, complex and arduous process, and needs expertise in "technology, military, finance, quality assurance, market research, contract management, project management, administration and policy making." In India, this process starts with the Defence Planning Guidelines issued by the Defence Minister, which then leads to the formulation of long-term, medium-term and short-term perspective plans, delineating capital requirements in different time horizons. However, as the Audit Report shows, these perspective plans fall short both on the count of timely completion and guaranteed budgetary commitment, resulting in poor fulfilment of planned capital requirements. In the case of the Army, for instance, since 1992 the planned induction of capital requirements in respect of various Arms and Services varies from 5 to 60 per cent. The poor fulfilment of requirements is ascribed by the C&AG to the unrealistic formulation of Perspective Plans, especially the five-year Services Capital Acquisition Plan (SCAP), which does not take into account the availability of funds and the lead time required for acquisition. From this it is quite evident that in the present set up the Headquarters Integrated Defence Staff (HQ IDS), which is responsible for the preparation of perspective plan in consultation with the Services, lacks the required expertise and authority to fulfil its obligations of preparing realistic Perspective Plans.
The formulation of Qualitative Requirements (QRs) of weapons/platforms/systems is one of the most critical aspects of defence acquisition and has a strong bearing on defence capability and costs. Despite several reviews of procurement procedures, from DPP 2002 to the latest DPP 2006, QRs are still found to be narrow, unrealistic, inconsistent with the available technology, and worse, are anti-indigenisation, anti-inter se prioritisation and vendor-specific. This has led not only to sub-optimal use of resources but also to time overruns. The C&AG Report has strongly recommended that QRs should be "defined in terms of required functions and performance level," instead of detailed physical and technical characteristics. However, it is not the first time that an oversight agency like the C&AG has requested that QRs be broad-based and generic and thus designed to elicit more competition. Previously, DPP 2002, DPP 2006 and the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Defence have all made recommendations on similar lines, but no substantial progress appears to have been made. It has to be noted that QR formulation is intricately linked to various other acquisition functions like solicitation of offers, trials and evaluations, etc. In other words, an inefficient QR makes vendor response restrictive and trial and evaluation process time-consuming, subjective and unfair. The 18 Army Contracts that were examined by the supreme Auditor show that out of 84 Requests for Proposal issued, only 24 vendors (less than 30 per cent) were pre-qualified after trials and, in none of the cases the number of successful vendors exceeded by two. Similarly, the time taken for trial and evaluation is found to be "unduly long" and lacked "objective and fair assessment". Keeping the above factors in mind, the current practice elicits the important question whether QR formulation should be left exclusively in the ambit of the Armed Forces/HQ IDS or whether should any other organisation, say a highly-professional acquisition organisation, have some role in defining the QRs?
At present, the Services Headquarters and HQ IDS are responsible for the formulation of QRs for the individual and common uses items, respectively. However, given the history of inappropriate QRs, leading to the vicious cycle of poor acquisition, an alternative approach needs to be worked out which would facilitate "faster, better and cheaper" acquisition and is at par with the best international practices. Given the structure of acquisition organisation in India, the present Acquisition Wing of the Ministry of Defence (MoD) is theoretically best placed for the job. However, in the present set up, the Acquisition Wing is not a body responsible for the whole range of acquisition tasks. At present, it is merely performing the procurement functions (a part of acquisition process), leaving the rest to other functional heads, like IDS for planning, DRDO for research and development, Armed Forces for QRs, industries for production, Director General for Quality Assurance (DGQA) for quality assurance and test and evaluations. Moreover, in its present form, the Acquisition Wing is not quite a professional organisation. With a meagre staff, drawn from the MoD and the Services for short tenures, the complex task of capital acquisition is performed without adequate expertise. The personnel involved in acquisition lack "adequate training or exposure to project management, procurement or contract management." This handling of complex defence acquisition worth thousands of crores of rupees without proper expertise and by a set of scattered bodies cuts a sorry figure when compared to the best international practices adopted by some of the major weapon- producing countries.
In the developed countries, Defence acquisition is increasingly performed by large and highly professional and integrated bodies like France's Delegation General for Armament (DGA), Britain's Defence Equipment & Support organisation (DE&S), etc. These professional bodies are responsible for all crucial aspects of the acquisition cycle, from planning, design, delivery, and upgrade to the final disposal of assets. The role of the Armed Forces in these countries are restricted to only providing the broad operational requirements, leaving it to the special bodies to attain these within the given time, cost and technology parameters. Acquisition is performed by qualified professionals, drawn in sufficient numbers from a range of specialisations like Law, Finance, Management, Technology, and they are retained sufficiently for long periods to see through major projects. Besides, they are given continuous education and training to become world-class leaders in their respective fields.
In India, by contrast, defence acquisition is performed by different organisations accountable to different functional heads. As a result, each acquisition process has to go "through numerous approvals and submission points". This not only creates cross-validation with respect to overall planning and requirements but also generates different views and approaches among the organisations at each stage of acquisition, making it difficult to perform the critical acquisition functions in an efficient manner. Similarly, the Acquisition Wing provides little value addition as it merely performs the procurement functions and is remotely placed from the planning process, defence R&D, Defence Production, Quality Assurance and Test & Evaluation, leading to lack of a single point of accountability which is critical for efficient acquisition.
To overcome the present deficiencies surrounding the Indian acquisition system, it is time to create a separate integrated and professional acquisition organisation by incorporating all the acquisition functions under one head. The benefit of creating such a separate integrated acquisition organisation, which is in sync with the best international practices, lies in the fact that it will not only provide timely and cost-effective acquisition but will also ensure a single point of accountability. As the Acquisition Wing of the MoD was established with the aim of integrating all the acquisition functions, it can be empowered to lead this integrated organisation with a wider mandate. However, to bring all the acquisition functions under the Acquisition Wing is a huge challenge, as it involves a complete restructuring of the existing organisational structures and a change in existing equations. But given the history of poor acquisitions, as pointed out by the C&AG, a radical change needs to be brought in to make Indian defence acquisition 'faster, better, cheaper', and more integrated, and at par with best international practices.
The emergence of several Islamic militant groups in North-East India and their ability to forge close ties with the region's most violent militant groups like the United Liberation Front of Asom [ULFA] and other foreign-based Islamic groups pose a major security threat for the region. Islamic militancy started in North-East India in the wake of the Babri Masjid demolition and the subsequent communal disturbances as well as because of Manipur's infamous Meitei-Muslim riot in 1993. A majority of these groups were founded between 1990 and 1996 with the prime objective of safeguarding the overall interests of the minority Muslim communities in the country's North-East. At present, there are about 20 such groups in Assam alone and another five in neighbouring Manipur. Each of these groups plays a different role. For instance, the Islamic Sewak Sangha [ISS] is said to be assisting radicals in crossing the Indo-Bangladesh border, while the Harkat-ul-Jihad-ul-Islami (HuJI) and the Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HuM) help them obtain training in Bangladesh and Myanmar.
The most active among these groups are the Muslim United Liberation Tigers of Assam [MULTA] and the People's United Liberation Front [PULF]. While the former confines its activities to Assam, the latter operates in Manipur as well as in the adjoining districts of south Assam. Their presence has also been felt in the neighbouring States of Nagaland and Meghalaya. The PULF added to its strength in May 2007 by absorbing the Manipur-based Islamic National Front.
According to intelligence reports, activists of the two groups have been taking shelter in Assam's border areas, seminaries and in areas dominated by religious minorities. In Assam, they have been carrying out a propaganda campaign in support of a separate "Islamic homeland," which, they envision, would be a society based on Islamic values and mores. For instance, the PULF has "banned" the consumption of alcohol among Manipuri Muslims since 2004. It has punished several people for peddling drugs. And it has asked Manipuri Muslims to wear traditional Islamic attire.
These groups have ideological ties with foreign-based Islamist outfits such as the HuJI and HuM, which are commanded by Pakistan's Inter Services Intelligence [ISI]. HuM had reportedly recruited and dispatched a number of Assamese youth for training as far away as Pakistan. HuJI is currently coordinating the activities of these groups. Security analysts have warned that the ISI's long-term goal in the region is to boost the activities of these Islamic groups and convert the region into a 'terror zone". It has also been making efforts to use several Kashmiri and Bangladesh-based Islamist groups in the region. The Lashkar-e-Toiba [LeT], according to Delhi Police sources, has been trying to tie up with North-East militant outfits like the PULF. This came to light following the arrest of three alleged LeT operatives hailing from Manipur, in Delhi on December 19, 2006.
So far, these outfits have chosen not to directly indulge in violent activities such as attacks against security forces. But their ties with foreign based Islamic outfits like HuJI and HuM is a cause of concern. In 2006, at least thirteen MULTA cadres were arrested in Assam and another eleven have been apprehended till June 2007. In Manipur at least nine PULF cadres were killed and another eleven arrested in 2006. Till July 2007, at least four PULF cadres have been killed, while twenty-five others have been arrested.
Reports coming in suggest that they have also established close ties with the region's most violent group, the ULFA. There are reports of some ULFA militants working as agents of MULTA. One among them is Bikash Roy alias Mallic Ahmed, arrested from Guwahati on January 22, 2007.
Both PULF and MULTA are reportedly engaged in gunrunning and extortion. They reportedly supplied assorted weapons to other local militant groups including the ULFA. MULTA reportedly owns several houses in the Sylhet district of Bangladesh to shelter recruits and some leaders of the outfit. They often use Shillong and Lad Rymbai in the Jaintia Hills in Meghalaya as hideouts en route to and from Bangladesh.
Apprehensions about the alleged plan of establishing an 'Islamic homeland' in the region has been further compounded by the steady rise in the Muslim population in the North-East in general and Assam in particular. According to the 2001 Census, the Muslim population in the North-East was recorded at 8,858,543 as against 6,805,647 in 1991. Out of this, Assam's share was recorded at 8,240,611, followed by Tripura at 254,442 and Manipur at 190,939. Five other states have Muslim populations of less than one lakh: 99,169 in Meghalaya, 10,099 in Mizoram, 35,005 in Nagaland, 7,693 in Sikkim, and 20,675 in Arunachal Pradesh. As the 2001 Census data indicates, in Assam, the overall Hindu population was 64.9 per cent as against 67.1 per cent in 1991, while the Muslim population for the corresponding years stood at 30.9 per cent and 28.4 per cent respectively. Though several factors might have contributed to this demographic change, several analysts believe that the unabated influx of illegal migrants from Bangladesh could be a major factor in this increase.
The impact of Bangladeshi migrants is also visible in the unstable demographic profile of Nagaland. With a population of 1,988,636 as per the Census of 2001, Nagaland recorded the highest rate of population growth in India, from 56.08 per cent in 1981-1991 to 64.41 per cent in the decade 1991-2001. While the population growth has been uniform throughout the State, several areas in the Dimapur and Wokha districts bordering Assam have recorded exceptionally high rates of population growth. Wokha district, bordering the Golaghat district of Assam, recorded a growth of 95.01 per cent between 1991 and 2001, the highest figure for any district in the entire country. Evidently, the silent and unchecked influx of illegal migrants in the district has played a crucial role in this abnormal growth.
Against the backdrop of these developments, the abnormal increase in the number of madrassas in Assam numbering about 1466, of which 810 are registered, is a matter of concern. Intelligence agencies are worried that many of these madrassas could become safe havens for radical elements.
Islamic groups have been silent on the burning issue of illegal migration from Bangladesh to Assam. Intelligence agencies express apprehensions about these groups being instigated into taking recourse to violence by other externally-based Islamic groups on the pretext of safeguarding the interests of the minorities facing harassment at the hands of organisations spearheading the oust-Bangladeshi campaign elsewhere in the region. Intelligence agencies fear that the tug-of-war over migrants of suspected Bangladeshi origin could become the trigger for groups such as HuJI to fish in the troubled waters of the North-East.
The emergence of these groups and their ability to strike deals with prominent outfits like the ULFA and foreign-based Islamic groups has added a new twist to the extremely complex security environment that besets the North-East region. The best possible way to counter this emerging threat is to break their nexus with outfits like the ULFA and their external allies. Not being able to break this unholy alliance will prove to be costly for India's security in the years to come.
After a month of global media frenzy, alliterative headlines, statements by senior politicians across continents, charges and rebuttals, the terrorist attempts in London and Glasgow appear to be finally gaining some concrete shape. The attempts, which coincided with the second anniversary of the July 7 terrorist attacks on the London Underground, and the subsequent arrests, present a changing trend. The most striking aspect of these failed terrorist attacks is the social and professional strata of the persons detained on charges of involvement. Profiles of the detained persons do not conform to the hitherto existing pattern of second or third generation Muslim immigrants or converts. Rather, persons with considerable professional expertise and a respectable career seem to have exploited the British National Health Service (NHS) to plan these attacks. Apart from sharing the same religious belief, the other common denominator among the perpetrators was their professional accomplishment.
However, strictly speaking, the involvement of professionals - based or raised in Europe - in terrorist activities is not all that new a phenomenon. Omar Sheikh - a dropout from the London School of Economics - was involved in terrorist activities in the Indian subcontinent. Dhiren Barot, a British convert, was given a forty-year sentence in 2006 (reduced to 30 years subsequently) on charges of planning terrorist attacks. It may also be recalled that some young German nationals or residents were recently arrested along the Pakistan-Iran border. German authorities suspect that young German nationals have chosen to go to Afghanistan to obtain training in terrorist camps there. Quoting August Hanning, the State Secretary for the Interior, as well as German Interior Ministry sources, German media reports have emphasised that Pakistan has become the Mecca for the training of Islamist combatants of different hues. The German Interior Ministry is reportedly aware of at least fourteen German radicals who have in recent months sneaked into Pakistan to obtain armed training there. German authorities are worried that these radicals might, upon their return, target installations in the home country. In fact, two Lebanese students made an unsuccessful attempt last year to explode suitcase bombs at Koblenz and Dortmund stations, angered by the publication of a cartoon series about the Prophet Mohammad in the Danish daily Jyllands Posten. And last week in Italy, police arrested an Imam and his assistants at a mosque in Perugia for using the internet to download combat training manuals as well as for hoarding chemicals used in the manufacture of explosives.
While European governments have been justifiably worried about the return of radicals from training camps in Afghanistan and Pakistan, they are at the same time confronted by a new trend - the involvement of autodidacts who use their professional expertise in other areas and supplement this with information gleaned from cyberspace. Observers of the global terror scenario have in unison suggested that the recent terror attempts in London and Glasgow were 'amateurish' or 'do-it-yourself' type and lacked 'professional execution'. However, the fact remains that that no government or security agency would wish to take any chance of attempts by such 'terror-clowns' succeeding even remotely, for it would only further encourage other autodidacts to indulge in such a sinister sport.
Apart from terrorist manuals that are freely available in cyberspace, rhetorical statements and more importantly the personal memoirs of jihadists who are believed to have waged jihad in various conflict zones also contribute enormously to the radicalisation of susceptible Muslim youth in Europe. For example, "The Army of Madinah in Kashmir" written by Dhiren Barot under the pseudonym of 'Esa Al-Hindi is a classic case in point. In this book Barot not only justifies violence in a non-emotive style but his vivid operational details offer proof of the authenticity of his personal experience. The book was originally brought out by a Birmingham-based publishing house, Maktabah Al Ansaar in 1999, and till Barot's conviction in November 2006 an electronic version could easily be downloaded from the internet. Thus, the threat of silent and quick radicalisation of students and professionals with access to sophisticated means of communications, especially the internet, looms large before the international community.
The question that now confronts us is how to tackle this looming threat. The United Kingdom, for its part, has, since July 2005, been attempting to send strong signals to home-grown radicals and to roving rabble rousers from West Asia and other places that the rules of the game have changed. British courts recently awarded forty year sentences to the four perpetrators of the foiled July 21, 2005 attacks in London, and a ten year sentence to Younis Tsouli - a Moroccan terror internet expert based in the UK - on charges of running Jihadi websites. Gordon Brown's appointment of Admiral Sir Alan West as the Parliamentary Under Secretary in charge of Security is also a distinct measure in this direction. Whether other counter-terrorist measures like longer detention periods, prohibiting the frontal organisations of virulent radical Islamist groups, and cooperation with affected countries would be successful in the long run would depend upon a wider political consensus at home. Nonetheless, the exact nature of the threat has been eloquently assessed by Sir Alan when he described the present threat of radicalisation of a section of Muslim youth in the UK as a generational one and that the remedial process may take a minimum of fifteen years. It is time to build upon this sound understanding of the problem at hand.
NAMICS OF MODERN WARFARE
Time and Space have collapsed in modern warfare. At one end, nations do not have the luxury of continuing to wage war for long durations. Apart from military, economic and domestic limitations, there is the coercive pressure of the international environment which does not permit much latitude. Therefore, the need to achieve strategic goals in the shortest possible time has become critical. The difference between tactical gains, achieved in a shorter time frame, and strategic benefits which could take longer, has blurred and future conflicts would focus on the latter from the very outset. For this same reason, political involvement in the conduct of military warfare has increased.
On a different plane, long range precision weapons have enabled parties to attack adversaries over great distances. This has nullified, to a great extent, the limitations of slow movement of battle which was the norm in earlier years. Added to these two is the networking of forces which not only enables real time sharing of intelligence and information between widely dispersed forces but also, if harnessed properly, permits the most appropriate and available resources to be brought to bear upon the adversary in the shortest possible time; to minimize the interval between sensing and shooting, ideally to zero, is the requirement. The speed of processing of information, decision making and execution are critical to achieve this objective.
Therefore, old concepts of jointness based on cooperation and coordination between different wings of the military with tri-Service execution are no longer enough; there is need to cement this with structures which are based on integrated planning and operations under one unified authority with responsibility and accountability. Such an institution will, obviously, have components of different wings placed under it but these would be subordinate to it and not to their own Service Chiefs. This is the requirement of modern warfare. The Indian system, in which these things are processed in a triumvirate fashion, is very unsuited to cope with the new environment.
Some naive arguments are projected by those who oppose changes. One of these is that the Americans need the kind of system that they have because their operations are stretched across the globe. This postulation is absurd. Sitting in the Operations Room of the US Central Command in Florida giving directions for operations in Yemen which would result in the neutralization of key Al Qaeda functionaries within ten minutes of their being spotted is no different to sitting in New Delhi and overseeing ongoing operations in the Arabian Sea or on the Western borders. Electronics provide real time data to both sets in the same time frame and the need for quick responses to developing situations is similar. It is not that the Americans must make decisions immediately while Indians have the luxury of time. Both must bring a variety of resources, some from different agencies, into play in the shortest possible time for achieving the best results. Also, networked forces now enable a composite picture to be available at Unified Headquarters instantly, unlike earlier scenarios when every platform reported to its own superior who then shared the information with others if he chose to do so. So, the type of coordinated trilateral operations which were typical of warfare in earlier days, are no longer appropriate or even relevant. The fact that almost all countries have followed the integrated command concept shows that this has nothing to do with global scale of operations.
HISTORICAL DIMENSIONS OF INDIAN HIGHER DEFENCE MANAGEMENT
To understand how and why India’s armed forces operate the way they do, one needs to go back into history. Until 1947, when India became an independent country, military affairs of the dominion came under the purview of Commander-in-Chief (C-in-C), India, second in authority only to the Viceroy. Following the creation of a Chiefs of Staff Committee (COSC) in Great Britain in 1923, a similar institution was also constituted in India but with a slight difference. Unlike the parent COSC, its Indian counterpart had the Chief of General Staff (CGS) at General Headquarters (later Army Headquarters) as the permanent head, reporting to the C-in- C. While the Chiefs of the Navy and the Air Force could approach the C-in-C and even the Viceroy if they felt this to be necessary, higher direction of all military forces, thus, vested under a single authority.
This picture changed after independence. Major General Lionel Ismay, Chief of Staff to Admiral Louis Mountbatten, the last Viceroy, was asked to suggest suitable mechanisms for higher defence management in the new nation. Ismay proposed a COSC comprising the three Service Chiefs with the position of chairman being held, not by any one service chief, but by the person longest in the chair; in other words, on a rotational basis. He also suggested various other arrangements under the COSC to facilitate cohesion in the functioning of the three wings. This inter- Service structure was, by and large, a replica of the organization that had existed in Great Britain during the Second World War.
Interestingly, despite their overwhelming victory in that War, and the experience of having conducted several very large-scale tri-service military operations — for some of which they appointed Supreme Commanders, e.g., General Douglas MacArthur in the Pacific theatre and General Dwight D. Eisenhower in Europe — the victors found serious flaws in their higher defence organizations. As a result, in the USA, a new dedicated authority termed Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), was constituted over and above the individual Service Chiefs, as the principal military adviser. All operational responsibility was vested in integrated theatre commands which had components from the three military wings subordinated to them. The Chiefs of Services were members of the JCS but had no direct operational involvement in their components. Many more changes have been made in the last six decades, many by legislation, requiring greater integration amongst the three wings of the military and this process is continuing.
In the United Kingdom, which had also seen Admiral Mountbatten as the Supreme Commander in South-East Asia during the Second World War, it took some time for the system to be reviewed. But by 1963, the UK had also abandoned the old system. The headquarters of the Navy, Army and Air Force were integrated with the Ministry of Defence. A dedicated Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) was constituted, over and above the Chiefs of the Army, Navy and Air Force, as the principal military adviser; Mountbatten being the first to fill that position in 1959.
A dedicated and integrated Joint Forces Headquarters (JF HQ) was created under the CDS to exercise command over all operations in which the British armed forces might be involved. In the UK, more changes are progressively being made to further integrate the three wings of the military. Since then, almost all countries which operate credible military forces, e.g., France, Russia, Australia, and Germany have shifted to the integrated pattern of higher defence management with a principal military adviser. Even China, about as old an independent nation as India, follows that system.
THE EARLY INDIAN EXPERIENCE
Soon after Independence, India established two military institutions which were tailor made to promote jointness. One was the Joint Services Wing-later to become the National Defence Academy (NDA) at Khadakvasla to train young cadets to become officers in the Armed Forces and the other, the Defence Services Staff College (DSSC) in Wellington, Tamil Nadu which would bring officers of the three wings together once again after about twelve years of service. To these were added, in due course, the College of Defence Management (CDM) at Secundera bad at a more senior level and, finally, the National Defence College (NDC) at New Delhi at the highest level of Brigadier and equivalent rank. This framework for joint training of officers at different levels and to bring them together again at different stages of their careers was, therefore, well laid and continues till now. It has yielded very good results in bringing about inter-service camaraderie.
Even as the large-scale migration of communities was taking place in the immediate aftermath of the Partition,Pakistan’s military forces, masquerading as freedom fighters, invaded Jammu and Kashmir. The ensuing conflict in 1947-48 was essentially an army action with air power used only to transport troops and equipment and to provide limited air support to ground troops. Later, in 1961, the military was again involved in a brief two-day conflict to liberate Goa, but this was without any opposition. Lieutenant General J.N. Chaudhari, then GOC-in-C Southern Command, was placed in charge of the overall operation. But that was the extent of jointness.
In the conflict with China in 1962, the Air Force and the Navy did not come into play at all and watched from the sidelines. Finally, the three wings did come to fight together against Pakistan in 1965 but without any preconceived plan. Marshal of the Air Force Arjan Singh, IAF Chief at that time, has said on many occasions that he came to know that air support was needed only when hostilities had already broken out and the Army was under pressure in the Chammb sector. The Indian Navy went about doing its own thing, and was of no consequence to the war effort.
In short, in all these conflicts, whatever their extent and severity, it was essentially only land power that came into play. The Air Force did participate more meaningfully in the 1965 war but without much synergy with the plans of the Army. No post-conflict enquiries or studies were ordered. India proclaimed itself as the victor, without any supporting evidence; so did Pakistan. Such lessons as were learnt were not publicized and the manner of functioning remained unaltered.
THE 1971 WAR
The war with Pakistan in 1971 was the first real military operation since Independence in which all three wings of the Indian Armed Forces were full participants. By April of that year, it had been assessed that military conflict was likely, even inevitable. The Army Chief, General (later Field Marshal) S.H.F.J. Manekshaw wanted time to complete preparations, for the monsoon season to get over and also for winter to set in so that mountain passes on the India-China border would be rendered impassable. These factors taken together, allowed the Armed Forces about seven months to get their act in order.
In this period, it was expected that the military would formulate a common and synergized plan into which operations of all three wings would be dovetailed. This did not happen. There was no integrated planning of the campaign which resulted in quite a few unplanned and uncoordinated decisions being made. As the war progressed, for example, the sudden decision to launch an assault on Chittagong, was soon changed to Cox Bazaar. The troops chosen, Gurkhas, with their short stature and relative unfamiliarity with water, were singularly unsuited for that purpose. There was no training, and beach survey, a crucial prerequisite, was inadequate. Not surprisingly, the operation was a total fiasco with no aims achieved and some lives lost. In another episode, IAF Gnats attacked Mukti Bahini vessels operating in the waters off Khulna without being aware that these were our own. One of the two boats sank, some of the crew killed, and others wounded and captured.
There is enough evidence in published literature of that conflict, principally from the autobiography of the then Air Force Chief, Air Chief Marshal P.C. Lal and the biography of the then Naval Chief Admiral S.M. Nanda, highlighting the differences in the way in which operations were planned and conducted by their Army counterparts. The attacks carried out on vital installations at Karachi from the air and by sea, were also not part of any combined plan. There are other instances of mismatch between the different wings. Lieutenant General J.F.R. Jacob, who, as Chief of Staff of the Eastern Command was responsible for conduct of operations in the eastern sector, has gone on record to say that the three wings of the military went about doing their own things without any synergy and that he, himself, disregarded the orders of the Army Chief in regard to the conduct of the land battle! No more needs to be said.
Victory in what was then East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) came swiftly, partly due to the demoralization of the adversary, and in the wake of resulting euphoria, few attempts were made to reflect upon and to correct the shortcomings. The argument was simple; the structure was working; it had just proved itself and there was no need for any change. Once again, the war was fought in a tripartite fashion with no unified or accountable military authority in command even though, as might be expected, the Army Chief was primus inter pares for the political leadership. Not unexpectedly, this reluctance to boldly institutionalize the ground reality resulted in more discord than harmony.
AT ODDS IN SRI LANKA
India’s armed forces were called to action in 1987 once again, albeit in a somewhat modified role, when they were asked to proceed as the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) to Sri Lanka. The government of J.R. Jaywardene was in confrontation with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Ealam (LTTE). This time a good beginning was made. The Chiefs of Staff Committee (COSC) appointed the GOC-in-C Southern Command, Lieutenant General Depinder Singh as the Overall Force Commander (OFC). Component Commanders from the three wings were subordinated to him with command of operational forces delegated from the Eastern Naval Command and the Southern Air Command respectively. A formal Directive was issued to the OFC to undertake the ordered missions in Sri Lanka. It appeared that the Indian military hierarchy had finally come of age; alas this proved too good to be true. In less than a month from the time that IPKF moved into Sri Lanka, the situation was turned on its head. The Navy and IAF Cs-in-C, responsible for providing forces, declined to delegate command and forced their superiors in New Delhi, i.e., the Chiefs, to get the component commanders designated as Liaison Officers with no role other than to act as go betweens between the headquarters of the OFC and of the Cs-in-C. Relatively junior officers were appointed to do this work, further diluting the authority and accountability of the OFC. The COSC, with no dedicated head, was, itself, shown up as a weak structure, with its own internal rifts and dissension and incapable of enforcing its will. The IPKF grew from one division in 1987 to four by 1989, but it was never one force under one command, as originally contemplated. The OFC lost credibility and was, in effect, just the commander of the land forces with the other two wings cooperating, but independently. There were numerous other areas of discord which need not be elaborated here. Apart from the political infirmities of the intervention, poor command and control must rate as the most important military failure of Operation Pawan.
KARGIL IN 1999
India went to war yet again in 1999, fighting to regain the hill positions in the Kargil sector of Jammu and Kashmir, taken over by Pakistan by subterfuge. It was essentially a land battle in which some air power was used to soften enemy positions. The Navy, somewhat exaggeratedly, decided to concentrate its entire strength on the western seaboard (such deployments do not come without great cost), signaling a degree of belligerence not visible in the political posture. It took two months for the Indian forces to regain the heights after Pakistan was forced to withdraw, partly through American pressure.
The war might have taken much longer had this not happened. There are now enough revelations to show the mismatches between the highest military leadership. The Air Force was not prepared to provide the helicopters that the Indian Army requested. The Army, for its part, was reluctant to share full details of what had actually happened. When the Army sought air strikes, the Air Chief, quite correctly, demurred on the logic that this required political approval. In short, once again we were stumbling into action without a synergized plan. If former IAF Chief A.Y. Tipnis is to be believed, matters had reached such a state that the then Army Chief, General V.P. Malik, angrily walked out of a COSC meeting muttering that he would handle things by himself. While some stress and strain in relationships are inherent in any tense environment, these probably exceeded the norm.
What, however, differentiated this conflict from the others was the fact that for the first time in five decades the government constituted a high powered commission to look at the obvious infirmities in the management of national security. The Kargil Review Committee (KRC) came up with a comprehensive report highlighting numerous weaknesses including an inadequately responsive structure for higher defence management. The government formed a Group of Ministers (GOM) which, in turn, constituted four Task Forces comprising persons of experience and knowledge to examine the areas of weakness identified by the KRC. These groups did their work with alacrity, produced reports within four months and in less than a year from its constitution the GOM had made several far reaching recommendations. Those relating to higher management of defence were the most comprehensive and, all save one, were approved. Unfortunately, the most important of them, crucial to the functioning of the armed forces, viz., creation of a dedicated Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) as the principal military adviser, was held in abeyance and continues to remain so.
WHY OUR MILITARY OPERATES THE WAY IT DOES
The historical dimension of the functioning of India’s Armed Forces has been discussed above. There are some other factors which have contributed to the military’s mindset. First, almost all conflicts that India has fought, have been essentially land wars in which the Army has been the predominant player. The threats faced by the country have been
focused across the border. Insurgency and low intensity conflict have also been in its domain. In fact, while the air and naval forces have found it possible to have long periods of peace interspersed with a few weeks of war, the Army has been continuously engaged, either in military conflict or in low intensity operations. There is, therefore, the feeling, not unreasonable, that it is the main, if not the only, armed force. Second, its size itself creates a feeling of self importance and as a consequence, a defensive mindset in the others. Third, the Air Force, traditionally seen only as a supporting arm, has consistently sought an independent stature, partly by refusing to get conjoined with the others, principally the Army and partly by stressing the strategic role of air power. The Indian Navy has a more fortunate position, operating as it does in a domain in which others can play only supporting roles. Finally, the Armed Forces, themselves, are quite happy with the existing arrangements in which each Chief operates and develops his own Service almost autonomously without any involvement with the others. The political
leadership has found it expedient not to disturb this unsatisfactory broth.
At this stage, it might be useful to consider how the Indian military operates. The three Service Chiefs, despite having been converted from Commanders-in-Chief of their respective wings into Chiefs of Staff in 1955, continue to act in their former roles and are, therefore, responsible for conduct of operations. They do this by issuing directives to their respective commanders; for example, in the Navy, these are the Western and Eastern Naval Commands which, in turn, give out orders to their subordinate operational commanders and task forces. Where any assistance is required from another wing, say air support from the Air Force, this has to be arranged through the Maritime Air Operations (MAO) authority in Mumbai, an Air Force institution, acting as the link. The MAO interacts with the appropriate Air Force Command headquarters which, in turn, issues instructions to the IAF station holding the relevant air assets. Often, Air Headquarters itself may have to be approached. The arrangement is about the same as far as the Army is concerned. All operational Army Commands have Air Force elements attached to them, not as subordinates but as advisers. They, in turn, interact with their own superiors to arrange the desired support through Air Force stations. In brief, the inter-Service interaction is through several tiers, both laterally and vertically. The desired air support might not be provided, possibly for good reason and even if it is, may not be in the form and strength requisitioned. Thus, the person responsible for execution of a task does not have control over all the forces that are deployed; on the other hand, the authority providing supporting forces is not responsible for successful achievement of the operation. The shortcomings of this system are readily apparent.
But the situation has begun to change. Most significant to modern day warfare is the recognition of the dominant role that air power must play in any military environment. On land or at sea, control of the air space in the operating area is essential to the successful conduct of battle. Whether provided by shore based aircraft or from those launched by aircraft carriers at sea, air power has become a determining factor. While it cannot replace boots on ground, its impact on warfare has become overwhelming. This, in turn, has, greatly diminished some of the sensitivities that prevailed earlier. The second major change is in the increasing dimension of concerns at sea. The sustained growth of economy, a key national interest, requires security of overseas trade and energy, both almost entirely seaborne, and safety of sea lanes and offshore assets has, therefore, assumed much more importance even as threats on the land borders are diminishing. The ability of seagoing forces to impact the war on land has also increased. For example, facilities on the coast as well as in the hinterland of the adversary, can, often, be better attacked from the sea than from land or air bases. Cruise missiles of longer range, which could be in our inventory in the next ten years, will further enhance this capability. Finally, no expeditionary or out of area activity can be carried out without the closest possible synergy amongst the three wings of the military.
Along with these operational imperatives, military hardware has also become extremely costly and it is essential that its induction should follow critical analyses of inter se priorities and cost benefit considerations which is possible only under an integrated planning system. For all these reasons, it has become even more important that plans of the three Services are developed and then executed in an integrated fashion and under one common superior. This is not to suggest that there will not be glitches even if changes are made in the way we do things; some of them might even be damaging in their effect, but overall, the likelihood of their occurrence will be much less and the ability of the organization to respond to them effectively, much greater.
THE ANDAMAN AND NICOBAR EXPERIENCE
That the need for change has been recognized, albeit slowly, is visible in some recent developments. The transformation in the command structure in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands is an example. This organization started with a miniscule Resident Naval Officer (RNO) from which it grew into that of a Naval Officer in Charge (NOIC) and then into a more elevated and robust Fortress Commander (FORTAN) of the rank of Vice Admiral. The Fortress Command was sought to be given an integrated profile with the positioning of a Brigade Headquarters with two battalions under its direct operational control. However, the Air Force declined to follow suit and its forces at Car Nicobar continued to operate under the orders of the AOC-in-C Southern Air Command stationed in Thiruvananthapuram in Kerala. Under this utterly archaic arrangement not a single sortie of even one helicopter could be ordered by the FORTAN! Thus, such integration as was there took on a largely cosmetic content with personal relationships being the determining factor; nevertheless, this was still something beyond what obtained on the
mainland. This half-baked arrangement continued until 2001 when, based on the GOM recommendations, this structure was finally converted into an integrated theatre command. The C-in-C Andaman and Nicobar, thus, became the first Unified Commander in the Indian Armed Forces with all three wings and the Coast Guard under his direct command. This marked a breakthrough in a system which had not seen any change in the fifty years that had elapsed since Lord Ismay. The integrated structure went through an initial period of acclimatization with occasional hiccups; the fact that it is subordinate to the triumvirate COSC with infirmities of its own and not to one superior adds to the difficulties. Nevertheless, the new integrated command was soon tested in the Tsunami disaster of 2004 when it proved itself by contributing substantially to the efficient conduct of the large scale rescue and relief operations based on synergized planning and execution under a single accountable authority.
QUO VADIS
So, where do we go from here? A second unified and integrated military command entity, the Strategic Forces Command, also under the COSC, was instituted at the same time as the structure in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands. It does not, at present, have forces under operational control -- these will come later -- but has responsibility and accountability for the strategic domain. These are positive developments. At present, in addition to these two integrated commands, the Army and the Air Force have seven Commands each, while the Navy has three. The Navy’s Western Command, responsible for the entire western seaboard, has to interact with two Commands of the Air Force, Southern and South Western and two of the Army. The same is the case on the eastern
seaboard. Similarly, the Southern Command of the Army must interact with the Southern as well as South West Commands of the Air Force.
The structure, as can be easily imagined, is not only cumbersome and inefficient but also wasteful in resources. Training, maintenance and logistics continue to be individual Service functions. Looked at dispassionately, there is just no reason why these functions cannot be combined in dedicated Commands with components covering all three wings. Operationally, there could be four to six theatre commands structured geographically; within them, unified commanders could be appointed for specific operations whenever these become necessary. Other integrated Commands for Space, Special Forces, Logistics, Training and Maintenance can also be put in place. The existing Commands could then be reduced from 17, as at present (excluding the two new Commands mentioned earlier), to no more than a dozen bringing about significant reduction in manpower while providing greater efficiency and accountability. Various models can be worked out but, in principle, unified and integrated functioning must be their theme. This restructuring will also enable the Indian military to become lean and mean; its present teeth-to-tail ratio is, possibly, the worst amongst all armed forces of substance.
It is not that this kind of restructuring was not examined by the GOM when they made their recommendations for the better management of defence. It considered that integration should be achieved progressively and provided, initially, for two such institutions. At the same time, it recommended the creation of a CDS who would act as the principal military adviser to the government and, apart from acting as the direct superior of the two new integrated commands, would also oversee force development in the armed forces. These arrangements were to be reviewed after five years in 2005 when further changes could be made leading to greater integration in the higher direction of military affairs. Unfortunately, the political leadership of that time accepted the need for an Integrated Defence Staff (IDS) but baulked at appointing a CDS, thus leaving the former without a head, and that of today has not found it necessary to order a review. It is necessary that the exercise be updated and more changes made. Sooner rather than later, India must have a CDS and integrated theatre commands and given the existing realities, this CDS, in the next five or six years, must be from the Army. In time, the system will settle allowing higher Commanders from all three Services to be eligible for the post.
There are some who argue that change must come from below. This is a fallacy. In every country where management of defence has undergone change, direction has come from the top, always from the political leadership, and despite great opposition from the military leadership. Of all systems, the armed forces are traditionally the most resistant to change which will, inevitably, impinge upon their established work patterns and turfs. In the USA, changes have been legislatively mandated which gives them greater meaning and provide no latitude for dilution. Some countries have taken the executive route. The former is preferable but given the Indian environment the latter might be more practicable.
CONCLUSION
Six decades after Lord Ismay put the higher Indian military structure in place, its contours have become frayed and its logic and rationale questionable, given the changed nature of warfare. The needs of today, much less of the future, cannot be met by the lethargic and unwieldy mechanisms that are in place. We are already well behind in adapting to these changes. Cooperation achieved through personal relations and friendship, facilitated by training together in joint colleges and academies, is a good thing but it can never be a substitute for well structured and formal institutions. It will not be able to stand the stresses and strains of modern military conflict. Wisdom lies in recognizing this truth and creating a system which will be better suited to cope with the new environment. It is time for the political leadership to look at the relevant issues critically and boldly. Until now, it has tended to avoid dealing with issues which would ruffle military feathers; consequently, sticking to the status quo has been the preferred approach. There is a sense that this hesitancy might also be due to the fear that a CDS could become too powerful an entity and that a weak COSC, beset by its own parochialism, is less threatening. Such fears, if they are there, are misplaced. India is now too strong a democracy to succumb to military adventurism; even the armed forces will not accept it.
In short, the time has come to take the bull by the horns. For this, it will be necessary to reconvene a fresh GOM, served by a group of experts, and move further down the road already taken. The Indian military of the 21st century must be equipped to cope with the challenges with which it is likely to be confronted, not only with hardware and manpower of the desired quantity and quality but equally with structures which will exploit these capabilities in the most efficient and economical way. Integrated force development along with operations under unified command, is the way forward. That is the real meaning of jointness, not what passes for it today._
